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timely preserved?1
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a
legal conclusion, this court should accord it no deference, and
should apply a "correction of error" standard of review.2

Creer

v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
STATUTE
Lessor's Liens.
38-3-1. Lien for rent due.
Except as hereinafter provided, Lessors shall have a lien for rent
due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon
the leased premises so long as the lessee shall occupy said
premises and for 30 days thereafter.
38-3-2. Priority of lessor's lien.
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be preferred to all
other liens or claims except claims for taxes and liens of
mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, perfected security
interests, and claims of employees for wages which are preferred by
law; provided, that when a lessee shall be adjudicated a bankrupt,
or shall make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or when
his property shall be put into the possession of a receiver, the
lien herein provided for shall be limited to the rent for ninety
days prior thereto.

Under S 38-3-2, U.C.A., 1990.

Standards of Review.
(a) Trial court's interpretation of statute presents question of law reviewed on appeal for correctness.
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990).
(b) The appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference, but
reviews them for correctness. When the trial court makes findings of fact based on the parties' stipulated
facts, the appellate court treats these findings as conclusions of law. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am.
Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988).
(c) When reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment, the appellate court inquires whether there is any
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court will liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power k Water, Inc., 798
P.2d 24 (Utah 1990); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989).

2

J»"J'" J.

Attachment in aid of lien.

Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under a lease, or the
lessee shall be about to remove his property from the leased
premises, the lessor may have the personal property of the lessee
which is upon the leased premises and subject to such lien attached
without other ground for such attachment.
38-3-4.

Attachment—Affidavit and bond.

The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of attachment file
a complaint, and an affidavit duly sworn to setting forth the
amount of rent due over and above all offsets and counterclaims and
a brief description of the leased premises, and shall further
state, under oath that such writ of attachment is not sued out for
the purpose of vexing or harassing the lessee; and the person
applying for such writ of attachment shall execute arid file a bond
as in other cases of attachment.
38-3-5.

When attachment will issue—Determination of priorities.

Upon the filing of such complaint, affidavit, and h :::n id i t shall be
the duty of the court wherein the same are filed to issue a writ of
attachment to the proper officer, commanding him to seize the
property of the defendant subject to such lien, or so much thereof
as will satisfy the demand, and to make a determination of the
priorities of the claims, lien.
d security interests I n such
property.
38-3-6.

Execution of writ of attachment.

It snail oe the duty of the officer to whom the writ of attachment
is directed to seize the property of such lessee subject to such
lien, or as much thereof as shall be necessary to satisfy such debt
and costs, and to keep the same until the determination of the
action, unless the property is sooner released by bond, or the
attachment is discharged.
38-3-7.

Release of attachment—Bond.

A bond iox the release of the attached property may be given, and
motion to discharge the attachment may be made, as provided in the
Code of r,4**i1. Procedure in cases of attachment,
38-3-8.

When chapter not applicable.

This chapter shall not t>e applicable to a written lease for a ter in
of years in which, as part of the consideration thereof, the lessee
or assigns shall erect a building or improvements upon the leased
premises.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the Case
This appeal concerns the priority of a Lessor's lien security
interest

as

against

a

Bank's

subsequently

acquired

security

interest in equipment located on the leased premises.3
(b) Course of Proceedings
Lessor filed its complaint and amended complaints and obtained
a writ of attachment on the equipment.
bank defaulted.

All defendants except the

The bank answered the complaints claiming its

security interest was superior to Lessor's lien.

The trial court

disposed of the issue on cross motions for summary judgment ruling
in favor of the Bank.
(c)

Disposition at Trial Court

The trial court ruled that the Bank's security interest was
superior to the Lessor's lien, even though it was perfected after
the Lessor's lien attached to the collateral.
FACTS4
The

stipulated

facts

are

that

Lessor

building located in Salt Lake Cityf Utah.

owns

a

commercial

On July 2, 1988, the

lessee leased space from Lessor in which to conduct a business.5
The lease ran from July 1, 1988 to August 31, 1993.

The equipment is laminating equipment. The equipment was sold for $150,000 by stipulation of lessor
and the bank with the liens to attach to the proceeds.
4
The facts are stipulated.

(R353-355) and (Transcript pages 1 and 5 ) .

The lease was between plaintiff WFPP Trust, as lessor, and Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow and
R-West Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, as lessee. (R-9).

4

Prior to the Bank obtaining a security interest, lessee moved
the equipment onto the leased premises,6

Subsequently, the Bank

agreed to extend lessee a line of credit. The dates of advances
under the line of credit are unknown to Lessor; however, financing
statements preceding the advances were filed. R. 255-95.
The lessee failed to pay the rent. On January 24, 1990 lessee
abandoned the leased premises. On February 2, 1990, Lessor filed
its complaint

and

on February

22, 1990 obtained

a writ of

attachment on lessee's equipment still located on the leased
premises•
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Lessor's lien security interest is superior to the Bank's
security interest because Lessor's security interest was prior in
time to Bank's security interest and was preserved in accordance
with §§ 38-3-1 through 38-3-6.
2.

Under common law "distress," Lessor's liens are superior

to security interests perfected after the inception of the lease or
the collateral coming onto the leased premises.
3.

If the Utah Lessor's lien statute does not apply, because

the lessee agreed to make improvements to the real property as part
of the consideration for the lease,7 then common law applies and
the Lessor's lien prevails as first in time.

This was sometime prior to August 4, 1988.
38-3-8. When chapter not applicable.
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written lease for a term of years in which, as part of the
consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a building or improvements upon the leased
premises.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

LESSOR'S LIEN SECURITY INTEREST IS SUPERIOR TO
THE BANK'S SUBSEQUENT SECURITY INTEREST UNDER
§§ 38-3-1 THROUGH 38-3-8, U.C.A., 1990 AND
UTAH CASE LAW

The Utah Supreme Court has given the following guidance in
Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq., N.V., 663 P2 56, 58 (Utah 1983):
U.C.A., 1953, § 38-3-1 creates a limited lessor's
lien:
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall
have a lien for rent due upon all nonexempt
property of the lessee brought or kept upon
the leased premises so long as the lessee
shall occupy said premises and for thirty days
thereafter.
Thus, by the express terms of the statute, the lessor's
statutory lien terminates thirty-one days after the
lessee has quit the premises. Therefore, Elks' statutory
landlord's lien expired January 16, 1981, and, barring a
contractual lien, Elks stood as an unsecured creditor
after that date. This conclusion is consistent with
prior Utah law. Eason v. Wheelock, 101 Utah 162, 120
P.2d 319 (1941); In re Stone's Estate,
14 Utah 205, 46 P.
1101 (1896).
In In re Stone's Estate, supra, we strictly construed a
predecessor of § 38-3-1. The former version, which is
almost identical, read:
Lessors, except as hereinafter provided, shall
have a lien for rent due upon all of the
property of the lessee not exempt from
execution, as long as the lessee shall occupy
the leased premises, and for thirty days
thereafter.
The lessee in that case died and left $270 rent unpaid.
Thirty-four days after the lessee's death, the lessor,
Eccles Lumber Company, brought proceedings to claim the
benefit of the statutory landlord's lien. This Court
held that the 34-day delay "brought the action of the
lessor without the terms of the statute, and [therefore]
his lien was gone." 14 Utah at 208, 46 P. at 1102. We
stated: "[A]t the expiration of 30 days from the day on
which a lessee ceases, for any reason, to occupy such
premises, the lien ceases to exist, and consequently to
have any force or effect." Id. at 207, 46 P. at 1102.
6

In Eason v. Wheelock,
supra,
we again construed a
predecessor of § 38-3-1 with the same 30-day cut-off
clause. There the holder of a chattel mortgage attempted
to remove property securing the mortgage from leased
premises before the 30 days had passed.
The lessor
locked the mortgagor out, and the mortgagor sued for
conversion. Because the mortgagor's attempt to retrieve
the property occurred within the 30-day statutory period,
we upheld the lessor's right to retain possession of the
lessee's property. We also stated that "[a]ny act after
that date would be one of withholding the property." 101
Utah at 165, 120 P.2d at 320 (emphasis added).
In these types of cases, lessors, to preserve their
statutory liens, must comply with the terms established
by U.C.A., 1953, §§ 38-3-3 through 38-3-6, including the
30-day period. These sections permit the lessor to file
a complaint against the lessee, request a writ of
attachment, and execute on the writ. Had Elks done this,
its statutory lien would have been perfected, and it
would have been prior to the Bank's security interest.
Applying Citizens to the facts of this case, the parties have
stipulated that Lessor preserved its statutory lien and security
interest by timely complying with Sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-6,
including filing a complaint against the lessee, requesting and
obtaining a writ of attachment and executing upon the writ within
the 30 day period. R. 2-7. The parties have also stipulated that
the Lessor's lien security interest is prior to the Bank's security
interest. R. 327. Therefore, Lessor has a statutory lien security
interest under § 38-3-1 which is prior and superior to the Bank's
security interest.
Oral Argument8
The trial court

did

not consider the Citizens case as

evidenced by the oral argument. The following summarizes the trial
court transcript.
A copy of the trial court transcript is attached as an addendum.

7

(a)

Bank's Arguments

During the oral argument before the trial court, the bank's
attorney recited the facts.9
With regards to the law, bank's counsel recited § 38-3-2 to
the court and argued that the landlord has a prior lien, except as
to

taxes, mechanic

liens, perfected

employee wage earnings.

security

interests, and

His argument is that the statute means

what it says; perfected security interest has priority over a
landlord lien no matter when it is perfected.
He argues that there is no guidance in the cases. He referred
to Gray v. Kappos. 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936), in which a
purchase money security interest was held to be prior to the
landlord's lien, but stated that the facts are distinguishable.10
He also stated that four other cases from other jurisdictions held
the

landlord's

lien to be

superior to a perfected

security

interest, but stated that none of the four jurisdictions have a
statute like Utah's. Bank's counsel argued that where the priority
is not set forth in a landlord lien statute, that the court then
looks back to the common law, and the priority is given to the
first attaching lien. If there is no statute, the landlord wins if
his lien first attached.

He further argued that if our Utah

statute does not apply to all perfected security interests, but is
9
The lease commenced July 2, 1988. The landlord's lien attaches at the start of the tenancy. The
perfected security interest dates from August 4, 1988. The equipment was brought on the premises prior to
August 4, 1988. The lease is in default, and the lessee owes the lessor $95,000. The bank loan is in default
in the amount of $150,000. The collateral was sold by stipulation for $150,000 and the competing liens attached
to the proceeds.
10

In Gray v. Kappos, 61 P2 613 (Utah 1936), the court states at page 615:
"The lien of plaintiff attached as soon as the sheep were brought upon the
leased premises . . •."

8

limited to prior perfected security interests, then there is no
need for the statute, i.e. we would be where we were under common
law.
Bank's counsel also argued that there was a good policy reason
for the Utah Legislature changing from the common law priorities to
making all perfected security interests superior to landlords
liens.

He argued that the Legislative policy reason was to allow

lessees to borrow money and to allow banks to take security
interests without worrying about landlord liens.11
The bank also argued that for the term "perfected security
interest" not to have priority over a landlord lien unless it was
created prior to the landlord's lien, the same principle, i.e.
priority of creation, should be applied to all the other statutory
exceptions, i.e. tax liens, employee wage claims, and mechanic
liens.12
(b)

Lessor's Arguments

Lessor's legal counsel in its presentation to the trial court
agreed on the facts and the issue and stated that the Utah statute
codifies the common law.

Lessor's counsel referred to Gray v.

Kappos. which involved § 52-3-2 Revised Statutes, 1933, as amended,
where the landlord lien was preferred to all other liens except

The reason for the statute being changed by the Utah Legislature is contained in Senate Bill 191,
which was to make corrections to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. In 1977, the phrase "mortgages for purchase
money" was deleted, and the phrase "perfected security interest" was implemented in its place. The Uniform
Commercial Code introduced the wording "security interest" to replace all other types of liens, such as chattel
mortgages, hypothecations, pledges, conditional sales, and the like. Thus, the statutory change appears to have
been made for these purposes rather than as a thoughtful analysis as to policy and priorities between competing
interests such as banks and landlords.
It should be noted that banks commonly use landlord subordination agreements before making loans
to known lessees. The bank could have avoided the risk of the landlord having a superior lien by using a
landlord subordination agreement.
Originally, the bank pleaded as an affirmative defense a landlord
subordination agreement, but apparently there was no such subordination in this case. (R-116)

9

claims for taxesr mechanic's liens, mortgages for purchase money.
and employee claims for wages.

The only statutory change in the

present statute § 38-3-2 is that mortgages for purchase money has
been eliminated and perfected security interest inserted in its
place.
The facts of the Kappos case are that the bank loaned Kappos
$2,000 in October of 1928 to purchase sheep. The bank took a note
and mortgage.

In January, 1929, a grazing lease was entered into

and the real property was used for grazing sheep for several years.
The note went into default and was renewed with additional monies
being advanced.

The first mortgage was never released; it was a

renewal, not a new transaction.

The sheep were sold in 1932, and

the landlord sought to satisfy its rent from the sale of the sheep.
The bank's lien came into being before the inception of the lease
and before the sheep were placed on the premises.

The landlord

claimed priority over the bank's advances made after the lease
inception and after the sheep entering the premises.

The bank's

mortgage was not recorded but was valid against those with actual
notice. The landlord acquired no rights greater than the lessee's.
The landlord's lien attached to what the lessee had, and the
lessee's rights were subject to the purchase money mortgage;
therefore, the landlord's lien was also subject to a prior purchase
money mortgage.
Mr. Orton, lessor's counsel, argued that the first event in
this case was the lease commencing July 1, 1988; secondly, the
equipment coming onto the premises; and thirdly the bank obtaining
10

a perfected security interest. In the Kappos case, the first event
was the creation of the chattel mortgage; the second event was the
inception of the lease; the third event was the sheep coming on the
premises; and the fourth event was the subsequent renewal note. Mr.
Orton argued that the Legislature intended prior perfected security
interests to prevail, but that if subsequent perfected security
interests prevail over prior landlord liens, that the landlord
could be deprived of his lien through "sham transactions." A lessee
could borrow money, give a perfected security interest, and defeat
a landlord lien. The trial court, Judge Stirba, asked Mr. Orton if
there were not remedies for that type of conduct under the Uniform
Commercial Code.

Mr. Orton responded that fraud remedies are

available, but that the rule from the Kappos case is that the first
in time prevails.
then

comes

onto

If the lease is first in time, the equipment
the

premises,

and

a

security

interest

is

subsequently perfected, the landlord should prevail.
(c)

Trial Court's Decision

Following the oral presentations of counsel, trial judge
Stirba stated that she had reviewed the pleadings and the cases,
particularly the Utah cases, and the prior and present statutes.
She

stated

that

the present

statute is susceptible

to both

interpretations advanced by the respective legal counsel.

She

stated it was not abundantly clear what the Legislature intended,
and that the Legislature did not specify that security interests
had to be perfected prior to the equipment coming onto the
property.

She stated that she had considered the statute and the

11

exceptions to the landlord priority. She noted that the exceptions
for taxes, mechanic liens, and employee wages do not require that
they be established prior to the collateral coming onto the leased
premises.

She also noted that the statute says the lessor's lien

is preferred to all of the liens or claims except for " • . .
perfected security interests." She stated the Legislature has not
required that perfected security interests be perfected prior to
the property being brought onto the leasehold, and that because the
other lien exceptions do not have to be created prior to the
landlord lien to prevail, that a perfected security interest need
not be created prior to the landlord lien for it to prevail.

She

noted this is a case of first impression, and that sham may occur.
Her legal conclusion was that the statutory language does not
indicate that the Legislature intended the security interest to be
perfected prior to the collateral coming onto the property to
prevail. Therefore, the trial court granted WestOne Bank's motion
for summary judgment.

She did not consider the Citizens case.

Furthermore, she did not treat the Lessor's lien as a perfected
security interest.

Had she done so, she would have reached the

correct, opposite conclusion i.e. that the Lessor's lien as a
prior, preserved security interest prevails over the subsequent
Bank security interest.

12

POINT II. THE LESSOR'S LIEN SECURITY INTEREST IS
SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S SUBSEQUENT SECURITY
INTEREST UNDER COMMON LAW DISTRESS.
Common Law Distress13
Distress for rent in arrears, whereby the landlord may seize
personal property on the demised premises, is one of the oldest, as
well as one of the most efficient, of the common law remedies for
the collection of rent.
Cir. 1908).

Re West Side Paper Co., 162 F. 110 (3d

The remedy had its origin in the feudal tenures and

appears to have arisen when the common law process of gavelet and
cessavit, by which the landlord could seize the land itself for
rent in arrears and hold it until payment was made, fell in disuse.
When these remedies fell into disuse, distresses appeared to have
arisen whereby instead of seizing the land, the landlord seized all
movables on the land and held them until he received payment.
Henderson v. Maver, 225 U.S. 631 (1912).

The right to distrain

arises from the moment the relation of landlord and tenant is
established, and as administered at common law, the remedy is
enforceable against any removable property found upon the demised
premises, whether belonging to the tenant or to a stranger.
Statutory Liens
Statutes giving the landlord a lien for rent on the property
of his tenant are considered to be the outgrowth of the common law
right of distress, and the principles controlling in cases of
distress are often resorted to in determining the rights of the
parties under such statutes. Wolcott v. Ashenfelter, 5 N.M. 442,
13

See 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Landlord's Lien, from which the following is summarized.

13

23 P. 780 (1890).

The statutory lien of the landlord for rent

attaches at the beginning of the tenancy, or when the chattels are
brought upon the premises.

Such a lien does not depend upon a

levy, and exists independently of the institution of any proceeding
for its enforcement. The remedy by levy, distress, or attachment,
is simply to enforce a lien already existing.

Gila Water Co. v.

Int'l Finance Corp., 13 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1926).

The landlord's

statutory lien must be enforced by judicial proceedings. Provision
is made in some statutes for enforcing the lien by attachment.

In

some jurisdictions, the landlord is required to enforce his lien
within a specified time; otherwise, it is lost.
Priorities
A landlord's lien for the payment of rent is superior to any
judgment or other lien acquired subsequently to the creation of the
tenancy or the bringing of property onto the rented premises.
Howard v. Calhoun. 155 Fla. 689, 21 So. 2d 361 (1945).
Generally, a landlord's lien created by statute has been held
to be superior to a chattel mortgage given by the tenant after he
has rented or entered into possession of the premises.

Beall v.

White, 94 U.S. 382 (1877).
Therefore, the only way the Bank's security interest should
prevail is (1) if it were perfected prior to the lessor's lien, or
(2) perfected after the lessor's lien expired. That did not happen
in this matter; therefore, the lessor's lien security interst
should prevail.
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POINT III. IF THE UTAH LESSOR'S LIEN STATUTE DOES
NOT APPLY, THEN COMMON LAW APPLIES AND
THE LESSOR'S LIEN PREVAILS AS THE FIRST
TO ATTACH.
Utah s t a t u t o r y l e s s o r ' s l i e n s are provided for i n Chapter 3 ,
S e c t i o n s 38-3-1 through 38-3-8 of U.C.A., 1990.

When Chapter 3 i s

not a p p l i c a b l e , common law p r i n c i p l e s apply. 1 4
S e c t i o n 38-3-8 provides

that

"this

chapter

shall

not

be

a p p l i c a b l e t o a w r i t t e n l e a s e for a term of years i n which, as part
of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e r e o f , the l e s s e e or a s s i g n s s h a l l e r e c t a
building

or

improvements upon the

e x a c t l y our f a c t s i t u a t i o n .

leased

premises."

This

is

The l e a s e was entered i n t o July 2 ,

1988, and the term was for a period of f i v e years and two months,
beginning the f i r s t day of July 1988, and ending the 31st day of
August, 1993.

Lease

Article

XVIII

provides

for,

"additional

conditions."15

The s u b j e c t l e a s e i s for a term of years with part

of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of the l e s s e e e r e c t i n g improvements
upon the l e a s e d premises; t h e r e f o r e , Chapter 3 i s not a p p l i c a b l e t o
this lease.

Under the common law, the l e s s e e ' s l i e n a t t a c h e s t o

the property f i r s t and the l a n d l o r d ' s l i e n has p r i o r i t y over the
subsequent l i e n of the bank.

Mr. Carney stated during his oral argument: "There are also cited in the other side's brief four
cases from other jurisdictions. They do hold that the landlord's lien is superior to the perfected security
interest.
However, in each one of those cases, and in none of those cases, did the state involved have a
statute like ours that says, 'perfected security interest shall be prior to the landlord's lien.' All of those
cases, it was silent on the subject, and simply said that the landlord would have a lien. In which case, the
court goes back to the common law, which is first to attach liens. And if we didn't have this statute, I would
suspect that is what you would hear. The landlord would win, the first to attach."

Lessor and lessee agree that lessee shall accept the building 'as is' condition and
agree
as follows: (1) Lessor shall furnish and install concrete floor to match existing in front of
warehouse, approximately 30' x 110'; (2) lessor shall furnish and install commercial grade carpet and
existing office area; (3) lessor and lessee each agree to pay one-half the cost to enlarge one existing
door to 14' x 14'. Final appearance shall match existing.

15

further
area of
base in
roll-up

CONCLUSION
The Lessor's lien security interest is superior to the Bank's
subsequent security interest and Lessor/ therefore, respectfully
requests this court to direct the trial court to enter judgment
accordingly.

DATED t h i s

l$TUr

day of Octoberf 1993•

&+~

* * ~

Robert F. Oi
Milo S. Mar{
MARSDEN, ORTOff, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

* * * * * * * * *

4
5

WILLIAM F. WEBB, Trustee of
the WFPP TRUST,

6

Transcript of;
Plaintiff

7

MOTIONS

8
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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1

I MONDAY, JUNE 10. 1991
P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

1

ipjjg C O U R T :

Let's go on the record in the matter

4

of William F. Webb against Ninow, case No. 900900672.

5

on behalf of the plaintiff is Mr. Robert Orton.

6

behalf of defendant West One Bank is Francis Carney.

7

Appearing

Appearing on

The matter comes before the Court on West One Bank's

8

Motion for Summary Judgment and the

9

Partial Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs Motion for

I reviewed the pleadings in the case

10

and I appreciate Mr. Carney's book here just summarizing the

11

pleadings and setting forth all of the courtesy copies of the

12

pleadings which are at issue, and I have reviewed those.

13

Mr. Carney, you may proceed.

14

MR. CARNEY:

Thank you. Your Honor.

Let me

briefly

15

highlight the facts and if I am telling you facts you already

16

know, please interrupt me.

17

THE COURT:

I guess the facts are not in dispute.

18

You folks are in agreement as to when these things all occurred.

19

It is just as I see it: the legal question of whether that is

20

a timing element in this.

21
22
23
24
25

MR. CARNEY:

Yeah, and in that regard the timing

element is that the lease is July 2nd of '88 and I think the
cases do hold that the landlord's lien attaches as of the start
of the tenancy. That would be July 2nd of '88.
And then we have the first in a series of perfected

1

security interest, all of which now are the bank loans starting

2

August 4, 1988. And we have the equipment brought onto the

3

premises sometime before the fourth of August, 1988. We have

4

a default in the lease.

5

The bank is in default on the bank loans, owed about $150,000.

6

The landlord is owed about $95,000.

The Court may not be aware of this, but the

7

collateral has been taken off the premises by stipulation of

8

everyone.

9

We happened to find a buyer who took the collateral

I and sold it and got the $150,000 for the collateral, and that

10

is sitting now in a bank account gathering interest, by

H

stipulation of everyone.

12

We have agreed that we would still

J treat the priority issues as if the equipment were still on the
premises.

14

I

15

J it says landlords have prior liens, have a lien which is prior

16

The Statute is 38-3-2, the landlord's lien statute.

to everybody except taxes, mechanic's liens, perfected security

17

j interest and employee's wage earnings.

18

I that this statute means what it says. We have a perfected

19

| security interest, therefore we are prior to the landlord's lien]

20

I

21

I the statute doesn't mean all perfected interest.

22

J perfected security interest which were perfected prior to the

23

I time the equipment came on or the collateral came onto the

24
25

Our position simply is

Now, as 1 understand Mr, Orton's position is that

property.

It means only

In other words, if you had lease, first event;

J second event, collateral comes onto the property.

Third event.

1

bank takes a lien, perfected security interest rather, that type

2

of security interest would not be prior since it arose after

3

the date the collateral was on the premises. That is the issue:

4

"Is that so was not so?"
I find no guidance one way or the other in the cases.

5
6

There is an old 1936 case referred to by Mr. Orton called

7

Grey vs. Cappos, involving some sheep.

8

purchase money security interest was prior to the landlord's

9

lien.

10
11

The court held that the

But I don't think the facts are quite similar to this

case, and the court doesn't really give us any guidance.
There are also cited in the other side's brief four

12

cases from other jurisdictions. The do hold that the landlord's

13

lien is superior to the perfected security interest. However,

14

in each one of those cases, and in none of those cases, did

15

the state involved have a statute like ours that says "perfected

16

security interest shall be prior to the landlord's lien."

17

All of those cases, it was silent on the subject and simply said

18

that the landlord would have a lien.

19

goes back to the common law which is first to attach liens. And

20

if we didn't have this statute, I would suspect that is what you

21

would to hear.

In which case, the court

The landlord would win, the first to attach.

22

If we were to interpret the statute to mean not

23

perfected security interest, but prior perfected security

24

interest, I suspect there would be no reason to have this statute

25

[That would bring us back to where we were under the common law;

1

first to attach liens.

2

for a good policy reason.

3

all perfected security interest to be superior to landlords•

4

liens.

5

premises to go out and borrow money and allow the banks to

6

take security interest and equipment which is on the premises

7

without worrying about the landlord.

10

A change from the common law to allow

Perhaps the reason was that to allow people who lease

8
9

I suggest that this is a change, perhaps

The other side says "Well, in this case, the landlord
I could be defrauded by sham security interest."

I guess that is

so, but I guess there is a way to look beyond sham security

11

I interest.

I also suppose that the landlord could take his own

12

J UCC-1 to cover future rents ahead.

I hadn't really thought

13

that through, but it seems to me that if the landlord was that

1**

concerned about the equipment, he could do that and then you wouljcl

15

simply have a contest under UCC-9:

16
17

first to file will win.

Basically, though, what 1 am arguing, if the
I legislature wanted to say "Prior perfected security interest

18

only," it would have said so, and it didn't.

19

security interest."

20

according to what it says.

21
22
23

THE COURT:

It says "perfected

We think the statute should be interpreted

Are you aware of any other cases, or any

case dealing with any of the other provisions in Section 38-3-2
J that contrue it one way or the other, whether they have to be

24

established prior to the equipment being brought up to the

25

property or —

1

\

MR. CARNEY:

2
3

1 have found nothing.

THE COURT: Or similar arrangement?
I

MR. CARNEY:

I have found absolutely nothing on this.

4

It says "perfected security interest."

5

1977 amendment.

6

security interest."

7

that '36 case and there is a M l case which I think is also

3

referenced.

9
10
H
12
13
14

I think that was a

Before that, I think it said "purchase money
It goes back to 1898 and there is only

THE COURT: The Eastman case?
MR

* CARNEY:

Yes, and I don't think that gives us

much guidance either way.
One other thing, I think if we adopted Mr. Orton's
position to be logical it would seem to me that would also have
I to apply to tax liens and to employee wage claims, and to

15

mechanics1 liens.

16

not have any priority unless they arose prior to the time the

17

lienable collateral was brought onto the premises.

So, for example, for tax liens they would

18

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Orton.

19

MR. ORTON:

It appears we are in total agreement on

20

the facts. Your Honor, and what the issue is.

I believe that

2i

really the statute codifies what the common law is and I would

22

like to spend just a little bit of time talking about the Grey

23

I vs. Cappos case. The statute which was in effect at the time

24

of that case was 52-3-2, revised statutes of 1933. And that

25

statute provided "that the lien provided for in this chapter

1

shall be preferred to all other liens

2

for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title,

3

mortgages for purchase money, and claims of employees for wages

4

which are preferred by law."

5

or claims, except claims

The current statute which was in effect at the time

6

this cause of action arose only makes one difference, and that

7

difference is instead of saying "mortgages for purchase money,"

8

it says "perfected security interest."

9

a lot of change in the two statutes. We are dealing now under

So really I don't see

10

the UCC where security interests are required to be perfected

11

generally by UCC-1 filing.

12

although the Grey vs. Cappos case doesn't come right down and

13

say it in so many words, it is helpful and let me just review

14

the facts of that case if I might briefly.

15

So with that in mind, I think that

In October of 1982 the bank loaned Cappos $2,000 to

16

purchase sheep and Cappos gave the bank a note and a mortgage to

17

security payment of the purchase price.

18

January of 1929, the grazing lease was entered into.

19

for several years thereafter, sheep were grazed on the landlord's]

20

property during the summer months of each year.

21

grazing lease was entered into, there was a default or non-paymentt

22

of the note and mortgage, and the note and mortgage were renewed.!

23

And then on at least two subsequent occasions, there was additional

24

money advanced and the note and mortgage were renewed.

25

Subsequently, in
And then

After that

There was]

never a release given of the first mortgage and the Court found

1

that the intension of the mortgagor and mortgagee was that the

2

new transactions constituted a renewal, not a new transaction.

3

And that is the way the case went off, as I see it.

4

were then sold in 1932, while on the premises of the landlord,

5

and the landlord brings suit to collect rentals due and owing

6

and seeks to have the sheep sold and collect the rent from the

7

sale of the sheep.

The sheep

Now, as I understand what the court is saying in that

8
9

case is. No. 1, the parties intended each new transaction or

10

each new note and mortgage as a renewal of the first note and

11

mortgage. And the earlier ones were not satisfied but there was

12

simply a renewal.

13

given to the intent of the mortgagor and the mortgagee.

The court says that legal effect should be

Further, the plaintiff does not claim that his lien

14
15

has priority over the first lien that was given, which came

16

before the lease and before the sheep were ever put on the

17

premises. And, however, on the later advances of money, he

18

does claim that his lessor's lien is superior.

19

that the mortgage, though unrecorded, is valid as between the

20

mortgagor and the mortgagee and those with notice of the

21

mortgage.

22

The court says

And finally, the court says that the plaintiff acquired

23

no rights which Cappos, the owner of the sheep, did not have.

24

The lien attached to whatever rights Cappos did have. And since

25

that right is subject to the purchase money mortgage, it must

1
2

3

follow that the lien of the plaintiff is also subject to it.
I I think that language is very helpful.
Our case is different.

What we have here is, we

4

have a lease on July lf 1988. followed by equipment coming onto

5

the premises.

6

coming onto the premises, there is a perfected security interest,

7

And that is where the difference comes in between our case and

8

the Cappos case; and that is that in our case the lease is

9

entered into and the equipment comes onto the premises before

And then subsequent to the lease and the equipment

10

any security interest.

11

the reason the court is holding against the plaintiff lessor in

12

this case is because it contrues the subsequent notes and

13
14
15
16

And as I view what the court is saying,

I mortgages as renewals of the earlier mortgage which did come
before the lease and before the sheep were put on the premises.
Now, I really think that if that were not the
I construction that the legislature intended to be given, that

17

certainly the lessor could be deprived of his lien rights though

lb

a sham transaction.

19

before the termination of the lease, seeing the lease coming

20

to an end and realizing he owes money on the lease, could borrow

21

money, give security against the property on the premises and

22

claim under the statute that the perfected security interest

23

given is superior to the lien of the lessor.

24
25

THE COURT:

A lessee presumably within a day or week

Let's suppose the legislature did intend

I that the statute not require perfection prior to the equipment.

8

1

I property coming onto the leasehold.

Assume that for a moment.

2

And someone did try to defraud someone by perfecting a security

3

interest in order to avoid the responsibilities of paying the

4

leasehold and having a lien attached, would you see no remedy

5

whatsoever in the Uniform Commercial Code for that kind of

6

conduct?

7

I

MR. ORTON:

There might be a remedy based on fraud

8

or something of that nature, yes.

9

Your Honor, which would support the defendant's position in

10

this case. And the law, we cited in our brief, I think, is

11

consistent with our position.

12

different and the statutes are somewhat different, I think if

13

you take everything we have cited and what I understand the

14

general law to be across the country, and then look at the one

15

Utah case we do have, and view the basis on which the Supreme

16

Court came down the way it did on this case, I think the logical

17

Yes.

I really find no law,

Although the facts are somewhat

I conclusion is that the lessor's lien in this case where the

18

lease was entered into first, the equipment came onto the

19

premises second, and then the security interest came after,

20

that the lessor's lien has priority.

21

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

22

MR. ORTON:

Thank you.

23

THE COURT: Mr. Carney.

24
25

I

MR. CARNEY:

remember what it is —

A small point. Your Honor.

9 —

I can't

9104 says that in order to create a

1

security interest, you must give value and if no true value is

2

given, then there is no security interest and a sham could be

3

taken apart like that.

4

questions I haven't answered.

5

THE COURT:

I will submit it, unless there are

No, thank you.

I have reviewed the

6

pleadings as I indicated previously, and the cases that you have

7

cited, particularly the Utah cases. Mr. Orton. I think —

8

I have looked at this statute and predecessor statute as well.

9

And I think that the statute may be suspectible to both

and

10

interpretations.

11

what the legislature intended with regard to that. At least,

12

it don't specifically address whether the security interest had

13

to be perfected prior to the property equipment being brought

14

onto the premises.

15

interests that are accepted under it; specifically, the claims

16

for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title,

17

and claims of employees for wages which are preferred by law,

18

none of which, I believe, are required to be perfected prior

19

to the leasehold creations, if you will, and the interest coming

20

onto the property, if you will, under the leasehold.

21

statute does say "that the lien provided for in this chapter

22

shall be preferred to all of the liens or claims except for,

23

among the other things, perfected security interest."

24
25

1 don't think that this is abundantly clear

I have considered the statute and the other

And the

After considering all of it and your arguments, as
well, I am persuaded that the legislature has not required that

10

1

the claimed security interest be perfected prior to the property

2

being brought onto the leasehold.

3

I don't see that the other interest there have to be perfected

4

either.

5

perfected security interest from other interest that it accepted

6

under that particular statute.

And I think that because —

And the legislature hasn't seen fit to distinguish

This does seem to be a case of first impression,

7
8

at least so far as the perfected security interest language is

9

concerned.

And because it is my view that —

concern about

10

sham security interest may occur, I think there is some

11

safeguard for that.

12

the statute, although not as clear as every one would like it

13

to be, the plain reading of the statute does not indicate that

14

the legislature intended security interest to be perfected

15

prior to the property being secured from coming onto the

16

leasehold, and that would be my ruling, Mr. Carney, Mr. Orton.

17

Therefore, I am granting West One Bank's Motion for Summary

18

Judgment.

19

Summary Judgment.

Accordingly, I think that the language of

I am denying the plaintiff's Motion for Partial

20

Mr. Carney, I would like you to prepare Findings of

21

fact. Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with the

22

Court's ruling.

23
24

MR. CARNEY:

Thank you. Your Honor.
* * * * * * *

25
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